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Abstract 
This paper analyses the continued decline of trade unions in Britain and examines the 
possible implications for workers, employers, and unions themselves. Membership of trade 
unions declined precipitously in the 1980s and 1990s. The rate of decline has slowed in the 
most recent decade, but we find that unions remain vulnerable to further erosion of their 
membership and influence.  
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1.  Introduction 
In a chapter written almost a decade ago, David Metcalf described the decline of trade union 
membership that took place in Britain during 1980s and 1990s (Metcalf, 2003). The current 
paper extends this assessment to the present day by looking in some detail at trade unions’ 
fortunes in the period from 1999-2009. In the last 10 years, trade unions in Britain ought to 
have benefited (at least until 2008/9) from a relatively benign economic climate and a 
relatively sympathetic government. Our assessment suggests that, whilst these conditions 
have brought some benefits – not least by helping to slow down the decline in union 
membership – unions are nonetheless weaker on most conventional measures than they were 
at the end of the 1990s and remain vulnerable to further erosion of their membership and 
influence.  
Any assessment of trade unions’ influence must consider both the monopoly and voice 
effects outlined by Freeman and Medoff (1984). The monopoly effect of unions concerns 
their ability to control the supply of labour. This does not typically occur at the point of 
recruitment but, once workers are inside the firm, union organisation provides a mechanism 
for workers to act collectively in withholding their labour if the employer is deemed to be 
acting in contravention of the interests of workers. This bargaining power can be used to 
improve terms and conditions or to prevent capital intensification and other organisational 
changes which might be perceived as having the potential to reduce job security. The voice 
effect of unions concerns their ability to identify the concerns of employees and to convey 
them in an efficient manner to the employer. This can save the employer time and money 
since it reduces the transaction costs associated with the transfer of information and with 
decision-making. It also offers the potential to lead to improvements in productivity by 
providing a mechanism through which the employer can efficiently access employees’ 
private knowledge about how working processes may be improved.  
The net result of these two possible effects is uncertain. The monopoly face is likely to lead 
to higher wages than would be offered in an equivalent non-union workplace, but only if the 
union has sufficient bargaining power – typically measured in terms of union membership 
density (the percentage of all employees who are union members). The voice face could have 
positive effects for productivity, but these might not necessarily be sufficient to counter-
balance the added costs associated with any union wage premium. The evidence summarised 
by Metcalf (2003) and others indicated that, in the 1980s and 1990s, a union wage premium 
was clearly apparent in Britain, but that trade unions’ monopoly power – measured by 
membership – was in freefall. Any voice effects associated with unionism were typically 
small, and certainly not large enough to subsidise the observed increase in wage costs. 
Accordingly, unionised firms were typically found to be less profitable than non-union firms. 
We consider the available evidence on these issues for the most recent decade from 1999-
2009. Our assessment is based in large part upon new analysis of data from the series of 
Labour Force Surveys and the British Social Attitude Surveys that have been conducted over 
this period. However, other data sources and published research are referred to and 
summarised where appropriate.  
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2.  Membership and Union Coverage in the Noughties 
2.1  Patterns of membership 
In the United Kingdom, where there is no state funding of trade unions and little by way of 
state support for collective bargaining, unions’ ability to recruit and retain members is critical 
to their ability to function. Union members supply the networks of lay workplace 
representatives, provide the funds which pay for central services, and also give the union 
authority and legitimacy in its negotiations with an employer. The dramatic decline in 
membership in the 1980s and 1990s therefore represented a crisis for trade unions. Union 
membership in the UK was at an historic high-point of 13.2 million in 1979, when Mrs 
Thatcher’s Conservative government came to power. By the time that Labour returned in 
1997, it had fallen to just 7.8 million. The figure now stands at 7.7 million (Achur, 2009). 
Trade unions therefore managed to stem the tide under successive Labour governments, but 
they have not managed to stop it completely. 
To explore the recent trends, we focus on union membership rates among employees in 
Britain, thus excluding members in Northern Ireland, the self-employed and those not in 
employment (around 0.9m of the total). The Labour Force Survey (henceforth LFS) indicates 
that the total number of union members among employees in Britain actually rose from 6.7m 
to 6.9m between 1998 and 2003. The economy was expanding at the same time but, in sharp 
contrast to earlier periods, unions were broadly keeping pace. Union membership density had 
declined at an average of 1 percentage point per year between 1989 and 1998 - from 38.8% to 
29.9% - but fell by a total of only 0.7 percentage points in the five years between 1998 and 
2003 (Figure 1). The hiatus was not to last, however. Whilst 200,000 members were gained 
between 1998 and 2003, twice as many were lost between 2003 and 2009. Density fell two 
percentage points to reach 27.0% in 2009. The pace of decline was less than half that seen in 
the 1990s, but the trend was once again firmly downwards.  
The recent trend is particularly notable because some trade unionists and commentators had 
begun to consider the possibility that the sharp change in the trajectory of membership 
density seen in 1998 would lead to rising density in the early part of the Noughties. In fact, it 
appears as though the plateau seen between 1998 and 2003 may have represented only a 
temporary slowdown before a period of further decline.  
One other noteworthy element in Figure 1 is that the 2008/9 recession appears to have 
brought about no obvious change in the trajectory. The recession has not obviously affected 
union jobs any more or less than non-union jobs to date. This may change, however, if there 
are large-scale redundancies in the public sector. These are likely to bring down aggregate 
membership density, since a disproportionate share of the jobs that are lost can be expected to 
be union jobs. 
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Figure 1: Trade union density among employees in Britain, 1989-2009 
 
Source: LFS (Great Britain). 
If we consider, then, how unions have fared among different subgroups of the workforce or in 
different parts of the labour market over the past two decades, it is clear that membership 
decline over this period has not been evenly spread. In the 1990s, union membership density 
fell faster among men than women; faster among manual workers than non-manuals; faster in 
the private sector than in the public sector; and faster among younger employees than among 
older employees (Table 1). Nevertheless, declines were seen across all of these groups. Since 
1998, density has continued to fall among men but has remained stable among women. It has 
continued to fall among manual workers but has held up reasonably well among non-
manuals. The decline has continued among middle-aged workers, but has remained stable 
among older workers and stayed reasonably flat among younger workers. The reasons for 
these differential changes are not well understood. It seems most likely that the patterns 
represent different rates of inflow to membership, with unions somehow having improved 
their success rate in recruiting older workers and so on. However, it could equally represent 
different rates of outflow, with unions now doing a better job than before at retaining some 
types of worker in membership, e.g. when they move to a non-union job. 
One consequence of these patterns is that the composition of membership has changed over 
the past decade. Union members are now less likely to be male (54% in 1999; 46% in 2009); 
women first outnumbered men in 2005. They are also less likely to be manual workers (38% 
in 1999; 32% in 2009) and less likely to work in the private sector (48% in 1999; 39% in 
2009). They are more likely to be aged 50 or over (26% in 1999; 34% in 2009) and they are 
more likely to be highly educated (21% had a degree in 1999, rising to 34% in 2009). 
Between 1999 and 2009, the stock of union members has thus become more feminized; it has 
become older; and it has become more educated. It has also become increasingly dominated 
by workers in non-manual jobs and those working in the public sector.  4 
 
Table 1: Trade union membership density among employees in Britain, 1989-2009 
 Membership  density 
(% of employees) 
Average annual change 
(percentage points) 






All 38.6%  29.7%  29.1%  27.0%  -1.0% -0.1%  -0.3%
          
Male
* 40.2%  30.9%  28.9%  25.0%  -1.6% -0.4%  -0.7%
Female
* 32.0%  28.3%  29.3%  29.1%  -0.6% +0.2%    0.0%
          
Private sector
** 23.9%  19.3%  18.1%  14.9%  -0.9% -0.2%  -0.5%
Public sector
** 64.1% 60.1% 59.2% 56.3%  -0.8% -0.2% -0.5%
          
Manual 43.1%  29.9%  27.9%  24.6%  -1.5% -0.3%  -0.6%
Non-manual 35.3%  29.8%  29.9%  28.4% -0.6% 0.0%  -0.3%
          
Age less than 
30 
29.7% 16.6% 15.0% 14.3%  -1.5% -0.3% -0.1%
Aged 30-49  43.5%  35.0%  33.4%  29.5%  -0.9% -0.3%  -0.7%
Aged 50+  43.9%  34.4%  35.0%  34.5%  -1.1% +0.1%  -0.1%
Notes: * series begins in 1992 rather than 1989; ** series begins in 1993. 
Source: Achur (2010) for ‘All’, ‘Male/Female’ and ‘Private/Public sector’. Authors’ calculations from Labour 
Force Survey for ‘Manual/Non-manual’ and ‘Age’. 
Some of these shifts are common to the workforce more generally. The rise in average levels 
of education is one, with the percentage of all employees that hold a degree-level 
qualification having risen by 10 percentage points (from 17% to 27%) over the decade. 
However, Figure 2 shows that each of the changes referred to above have been more 
pronounced among union members than among non-members, because of the differential 
changes in union density. As the composition of the stock of union membership changes, it 
can be expected to lead to changes in unions’ priorities, perhaps even intensifying the focus 
on issues such as the gender pay gap, pension entitlements and public sector employment.  5 
 
Figure 2: Changes in the characteristics of union members and non-members, 1999-
2009 
 
Note: U = union members; NU = non-members. 
Source: LFS (Great Britain). 
2.2  Prospects for the future 
There are relatively few signs of growth at the present time. Table 2 lists the ten largest 
unions by membership in 1999, using data from the annual reports which each union must 
submit to the Certification Officer. The table shows the total reported membership of each 
union in 1999 and 2009, plus the change over the ten-year period. It is apparent that the large 
general unions, Unite and GMB, lost large numbers of members over the decade from 1999-
2009.  There was growth for a number of occupation or sector-specific unions, notably: RCN 
and BMA in the health sector; and NUT, NASUWT and ATL in education. However, 
education and health were areas of considerable public sector expansion in the late 1990s and 
early Noughties. Public sector employment in education increased by around 0.25m jobs 
(20%) between 1998 and 2005, whilst employment in the NHS increased by over 0.3m jobs 
(18%) (Hicks et al, 2005: 7-8). It is therefore notable that membership density only remained 
stable in the ‘Education’ sector, where a density rate of 53.6% in 2009 was little changed 
from the rate of 53.7% seen in 1999, and fell in ‘Health and social work’ from 44.9% to 
41.6%. So although some unions in education and health appear to have been able to recruit 
many of these additional employees into membership, they do not appear to have been 
increasing their reach within these sectors. At best, they were merely keeping pace with job 
creation.
1  
                                                 
1 Over the period 1999-2009 membership density rose in only one industry sector: ‘Wholesale and retail’, where 
it rose from 11.3% to 12.4% (Achur, 2009: Table 3.4). Density fell in every one of the remaining 11 Sections of 
the Standard Industrial Classification (2003). 6 
 
Table 2: Membership of individual unions, 1999 and 2009 
Notes: * Unite did not exist in 1999, but we assume that it did for comparative purposes. Unite came into 
existence through various mergers (MSF merged with the AEEU to form Amicus in 2001; this was followed by 
mergers with the GMPU and Unifi in 2004; Amicus then merged with the TGWU in 2007 to form Unite). It 
may be contended that some of its membership loss may be the result of the cleaning of membership databases 
during the merger process. However, this seems unlikely since total membership reported by all unions to the 
Certification Officer fell by 2% between 1999 and 2009, which is less than the fall recorded in the LFS.  
Source: Annual reports of the Certification Officer. 
Figure 1 confirms that, although trade union membership density is currently almost four 
times higher in the public sector than in the private sector (56%, compared with 15%), 
density in the two sectors has been declining at roughly the same rate over the past decade. 
Density fell by 3.5 percentage points in the public sector between 1999 and 2009, whereas it 
fell 4.0 percentage points in the private sector over the same period. More than two 
percentage points of the public sector decline came in the period 2007-2009. Such a pattern 
cannot be blamed, as in earlier periods, on the removal of highly-unionised sections of the 
public sector through privatisation. And if the expansion of the public sector is now over – as 
one would expect – then there appear to be some notable signs of concern for public sector 
unions (and by inference, for unions as a whole).  
 
 1999  2009  1999-2009 
 Members  Rank  MembersRank
Membership 
change %  change 
Rank 
change 
             
Unite the union
* 2,715,660  1 1,952,226 1 -763,434 -28%  0
UNISON 1,272,330  2  1,344,000 2 71,670 6%  0
GMB 712,010  3  590,125 3 -121,885 -17%  0
RCN 320,206  4  393,865 4 73,659 23%  0
USDAW 303,060  5  356,046 6 52,986 17% -1
CWU 287,732  6  236,679 9 -51,053 -18%  -3
NUT 286,503  7  374,170 5 87,667 31%  +2
NASUWT 250,783  8  313,350 7 62,567 25%  +1
PCS 245,350  9  304,829 8 59,479 24%  +1
ATL 168,027  10  208,568 10 40,541 24%  0
UCATT 111,804  11  129,065 12 17,261 15%  -1
BMA 106,864  12  138,359 11 31,495 29%  +1
             
Total unions  220   170    -23%  
Total members  7,807,417   7,651,561    -2%  
Members/union  35,488    45,009      27%   7 
 
 
2.3  Bargaining coverage and free-riding 
We have focused thus far union membership. However another important indicator of union 
strength is whether unions can persuade employers to negotiate with them over wages. The 
proportion of all employees who have their pay set by collective bargaining has, in common 
with membership density, been in decline since the 1980s. The scale of the decline since 
1979 is difficult to establish precisely but estimates suggest that it has fallen roughly by a 
half, with most of the fall coming before the end of the 1990s (see, for example, Millward et 
al, 2000). Coverage has been measured consistently in the LFS since 1999 and, over the ten 
years since then, has fallen from 36.0% to 32.5% in 2009 (Table 3). Virtually all (2.8 
percentage points) of this recent fall has come since 2003, with much of it (2 percentage 
points) having occurred since 2007. Unions’ role in setting terms and conditions thus 
continues to be under pressure.  
Table 3: Coverage of collective bargaining among employees in Britain, 1999-2009 
 Coverage 
(% of employees) 
Average annual change 
(percentage points) 
 1999  2003  2009  1999-2003  2003-2009 
All 36.0%  35.6%  32.5%  -0.1%  -0.5% 
          
Private sector  23.1%  22.0%  17.6%  -0.3%  -0.7% 
Public sector  71.7%  71.1%  67.4%  -0.1%  -0.6% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS (Great Britain). 
As with membership, the aggregate figure masks considerable differences between the 
private sector (where coverage stood at 18% in 2009) and the public sector (where it stood at 
67%). However, a small decline in coverage has characterised both sectors over the past 
decade. De-recognition has played a relatively minor role. Instead, a key determinant of the 
patterns seen in the private sector has been the inability of trade unions to gain recognition for 
collective bargaining in newly-established workplaces. Increasing product market 
competition appears to be have been an important factor in employers’ decision making: the 
decline in coverage in the private sector has been less pronounced in more profitable industry 
sectors than in those where profits were either historically small or have been squeezed 
(Brown et al., 2009). The introduction in 1999 of statutory support for union recognition has 
had little effect simply because there are so few non-recognised workplaces where unions 
have, or can attract, the support of large numbers of employees, as is necessary to trigger the 
statutory procedure. In the public sector, it is the gradual replacement of collective bargaining 
with independent pay review bodies that has been the dominant cause of declining coverage.  
Recognition for collective bargaining has always gone hand in hand with union membership, 
and so the decline in coverage should be a notable cause for concern among unions desperate 
to retain their membership base. Yet the securing of recognition by a union no longer serves 
to guarantee a certain level of membership support in the way that it did even ten years ago. 
Membership density has actually remained stable (at around 11%) among non-covered 
employees since 1999; instead, the fall in overall membership density since 1999 has all 8 
 
occurred among covered employees (from 66.9% in 1999 to 63.1% in 2009) (Figure 3). In 
1999, a covered employee was 30 percentage points more likely to be a union member than a 
non-covered employee, after controlling for other factors; by 2009 this figure had declined to 
26 percentage points. The result has been an increase in ‘free-riding’.  
Figure 3: Union membership density among employees covered by collective bargaining 







1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
All employees Private sector Public sector
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from QLFS (Great Britain). 
There has been a particularly notable increase in free-riding in the private sector: 63% of 
covered private sector employees were union members in 1999, but this had fallen to 57% by 
2009. In the public sector, there was virtually no change between 1999 (71%) and 2007 
(70%), but then a sharp drop (to 67%) between 2007 and 2009. If one examines the 
propensity to free-ride in 2009, after controlling for a range of employee and job 
characteristics, this is greater among non-manuals than manuals (by around 4 percentage 
points) and greater among part-timers than full-timers (by around 9 percentage points). It is 
also unsurprisingly much greater among temporary staff than permanent employees (by 19 
percentage points). It is 11 percentage points greater among private sector employees than 
among public sector employees.  
There are currently almost three million free-riders among the eight million covered 
employees in Britain. This share is rising, which constitutes another danger sign for trade 
unions since they are incurring the costs of representing such workers in pay negotiations but 
receive no ‘payment’ for this service in the form of membership subscriptions. 9 
 
 
2.4  Explaining the continued decline in membership density 
One might wonder whether the three percentage point decline in membership density seen 
over the past decade actually reflects any change in employees’ attitudes towards union 
membership? In fact, none of the decline in union membership density since the late 1990s 
can be explained by changes in the types of jobs on offer in the British economy (for 
instance, rise of private services, the increase in part-time or temporary work, the declining 
coverage of collective bargaining).  
We noted above that the propensity to be a union member dropped 2.7 percentage points 
between 1998 and 2009 (see Table 1). If we control for a range of individual, job and 
workplace characteristics
2 in a regression analysis, the residual propensity to belong to a 
union declines by 3.1 percentage points between 1998 and 2009. We see a similar decline if 
we impute the characteristics of the population of employees from 1998 into a regression of 
the propensity to be a union member in 2008. Thus there was an overall reduction in interest 
among employees which cannot be explained by the types of jobs they were doing or the 
types of establishments they worked in. 
Similarly, none of the overall rise in free-riding can be explained by changes in the types of 
jobs and employees that are covered by collective bargaining. After controlling for employee 
and job characteristics, the residual propensity to be a union member when covered by 
collective bargaining declined by 5.0 percentage points between 1999 and 2009 (compared 
with an actual fall of 3.8 percentage points).
3 Consequently, the rise in free-riding would 
actually have been greater had it not been for compositional change.  
2.5  Never-membership 
In the final part of this section on union membership we report on another notable feature of 
the past decade, which is the continued rise in ‘never-membership’. As shown in Figure 4, the 
percentage of all employees who have never been a union member doubled between the mid-
1980s and the late 1990s, but it has continued to rise in the past decade. By 2006-8, half of all 
employees were ‘never-members’. In contrast, the percentage of employees who have been 
members in the past has remained roughly constant at about one-fifth. In the private sector, 
the proportion of employees who are ‘never-members’ rose from two-fifths in the mid-1980s 
to three-fifths in 2006-2008.  
                                                 
2 Gender, age, age squared, qualifications (5 categories), white/non-white, manual/non-manual, 
temporary/permanent, full-time/part-time, size of workplace (25+ employees), private/public sector, industry 
sector (13 categories), region (21 categories) and whether the employee is covered by collective bargaining. 
3 Again, we see a similar decline if we impute the characteristics of the population of employees from 1999 into 
a regression of the propensity to be a union member in 2009. 10 
 
Figure 4: The rise of never-membership among employees in Britain, 1985-2008 
 
Note: Employees working 10+ hours per week. 
Source: Authors calculations from BSAS. 
In the 1980s, it seemed that a principal cause of the fall in union density was a decline in 
employer and government support for union membership, most clearly evident in the decline 
and eventual outlawing of the closed shop (Millward et al., 2000: 145-152). In the 1990s, the 
principal cause of the continued decline was instead a waning of the appetite for unionism 
among employees (ibid.). Membership may have stabilised temporarily in the benign 
economic and political climate which characterised the first few years of New Labour, but 
enthusiasm among employees now seems to be waning once more. Unions’ ability to address 
this situation will ultimately depend upon what they have to offer.  11 
 
3.  Unions’ Response 
3.1  Unions’ organizational capacity 
In order to examine union’s ability to respond, we first consider their organizational capacity. 
One important element of this capacity concerns their financial resources. Figure 5 uses data 
from the Certification Officer to examine the total income and expenditure of all trade unions 
over the period 2000-2008. It shows that unions, in aggregate, were barely solvent in the first 
half of the current decade. Their total income (the dashed line) barely exceeded their total 
expenditure (the dotted line): the ratio was just above 1. Since 2004, however, they have 
managed to increase their income whilst holding expenditure broadly steady. This has 
improved their financial position.  
Figure 5: Unions’ financial resources, 2000-2008 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the Certification Officer. 
Around half of this extra income has come from members, presumably in the form of higher 
subscriptions. The average income per member has gone up from around £90 per annum to 
around £100 per annum in recent years. The source of the remaining increase in income is not 
known, as the Certification Officer data provide no further details. One possibility may be 
that unions have been able to dispose of duplicated assets after mergers. In any event, unions’ 
financial position is now looking healthier, despite the continued decline in membership.  
Unions’ network of lay representatives (shop stewards) also appears to have remained intact, 
at least until the early part of the Noughties. Union lay representatives constitute a member’s 
first port of call if they have a problem at work and are often also involved in pay bargaining. 
They also do much of a union’s recruitment. Their continued presence in workplaces is thus 
crucial to a union’s organizational capacity. Figure 6 shows estimates from the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey; the most recent of these surveys was in 2004 but the next 
survey, which will take place in 2011, will provide up-to-date estimates. The bars in the 
figure show estimates of the total number of workplace lay representatives. The number 12 
 
declined substantially in the second half of the 1980s, falling to an even greater degree than 
membership (the average number of members per lay representative rose from 25 in 1984 to 
37 in 1990). However, although the number of stewards continued to decline in the 1990s and 
early Noughties, the number of members per representative has remained stable. The recent 
fall has therefore only been in proportion to the overall decline in membership. Clearly, union 
lay representatives were spread more thinly in 2004 than they had been in early 1980s, but 
they were no worse off in that respect than they had been even in 1990.  
Figure 6: Numbers of union lay representatives, 1980-2004 
 
Source: Charlwood and Forth (2009). 
3.2  Wage premium and wage dispersion 
Historically, one of the principal benefits for union members in Britain has been the delivery 
of a wage premium over similar non-members through unions’ collective bargaining 
activities. It is often assumed that declining union membership and collective bargaining 
coverage imply a lower union wage premium. This is not necessarily so, as it will depend 
upon whether those instances of union organisation that have disappeared were weaker or 
stronger than the average; logic might suggest the former. However, the increase in free-
riding is one factor that points towards a weakening of union power in organisations where 
they remain present and, indeed, the consensus is that the union wage premium declined in 
magnitude during the 1980s and 1990s, as it did in other countries such as the USA 
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003). We update the picture for Britain using the LFS. Table 4 
shows that the decline has continued in the most recent decade. Having stood at over 10% in 
the mid-1990s, the premium enjoyed by union members (after controlling for other 




Table 4: Union wage premium, by year and gender 














1994  28.8  13.9 21.3 9.7  34.6 17.3 
1995  26.6  9.0 18.7  6.2 32.2  12.0 
1996  28.4  12.3 22.0 9.8  33.3 14.8 
1997  25.9  8.8 17.6  6.6 33.3  11.7 
1998  24.4  8.3 15.0  4.2 33.3  12.4 
1999  22.7  7.8 13.9  5.4 31.1  11.1 
2000  22.4  8.5 15.3  6.8 29.0  10.9 
2001  22.4  9.2 16.9  7.3 27.2  12.0 
2002  21.1  8.6 15.4  6.9 26.9  10.4 
2003  22.3  8.1 15.4  6.3 28.8  10.5 
2004  21.3  7.0 15.4  5.5 27.4  9.0 
2005 22.4  6.9  15.2  2.9  (ns)  30.7  10.7 
2006  20.6  6.6 13.6  3.5 28.9  9.9 
2007  20.9  6.7 14.8  3.2 28.2  9.9 
2008 18.3  5.2  11.6  1.4  (ns)  25.9  8.7 
2009  20.7  5.9 16.7  3.3 26.4  8.8 
Notes:  
1.  Regression-adjusted gap based on models with following controls: gender, age, age squared, 
qualifications (5 categories), white/non-white, manual/non-manual, temporary/permanent, full-
time/part-time, size of workplace (25+ emps), private/public sector, industry sector (13 categories), 
region (21 categories) and whether the employee is covered by collective bargaining. 
2.  ns = not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the LFS (GB). 
The table suggests that the premium may have increased slightly between 2008 and 2009. 
Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) have shown that changes over time in the magnitude of the 
wage premium are associated with the changing fortunes of the economy. Specifically, the 
wage premium in Britain appeared to rise and fall in line with unemployment over the 1980s 
and 1990s, perhaps because unions may have been more successful than non-union workers 
in resisting downward pressure on wages during the downturns. The slight upturn in 2009 
may thus represent a continuation of this pattern. However, there was considerable evidence 
of wage restraint among unions as a means of securing jobs in the 2008/9 recession and so it 
remains to be seen whether the 2010 data provide any further evidence of a cyclical 
dimension to recent movements in the wage premium.  
Finally in relation to Table 4, it can be noted that female union members have typically 
enjoyed a larger wage premium than their male counterparts, and that this continues to be the 
case. Female union members currently enjoy a wage premium over female non-members of 
around 9% (down from around 11% in the late 1990s), whereas among male employees the 
premium has fallen from around 7% to around 3%.  14 
 
In addition to the historic presence of a wage premium for union members, it has also long 
been observed that wages in unionised jobs are less widely dispersed. This lower dispersion 
arises both because unions raise the wages of the lowest paid and also because they 
encourage the use of more objective criteria in pay setting. The decline in the coverage of 
union wage setting has thus contributed to a general increase in wage inequality (Card et al., 
2003). But do unions still narrow the dispersion of wages where they are present?  
One means of assessing this is to regress hourly wages on a standard set of employee, job and 
workplace characteristics (as above), and then to compare the dispersion of the unexplained 
portion of the wage (the residual) for union and non-union employees. This can be done using 
the LFS for the period 1994-2009. The results show that, in 2009, the dispersion in the 
residuals among employees who are not members of a union was 16% larger than the 
dispersion found among union members (Table 5). This figure does vary over time, but the 
average over the past decade and a half is 12%. So although the advantage that union 
members hold over non-members in terms of their overall average rate of pay has declined, 
the ‘sword of justice’ effect whereby unions compress pay differentials remains.  
Table 5: Relative wage dispersion among union members and non-members, by year 
and gender 
  All employees  Male employees  Female employees 










1994 21.1  10.7  31.9  14.5  6.1  8.0 
1995  22.9  16.4 30.9 18.8 11.2 15.6 
1996 25.2  16.9  39.0  22.8  8.7  12.3 
1997  23.3  10.2 29.5 12.8 11.4  7.2 
1998 25.9  12.7  35.8  18.9  9.9  7.1 
1999  24.0  11.5 29.9 13.3 10.6  9.4 
2000  21.0  7.7 25.4 5.9 11.2 8.3 
2001  24.1  13.7 30.3 16.6 14.9 11.8 
2002  20.9  12.1 24.8 11.9 12.8 12.4 
2003  20.0  11.9 22.2 16.8 12.9  8.7 
2004 19.9  13.2  27.4  19.0  8.4  8.3 
2005  19.3  9.0 30.0  20.5 4.7  0.1 
2006 17.8  7.5  21.0  9.4  9.1  5.9 
2007  21.7  11.2 24.7 12.1 13.8 10.5 
2008 20.3  11.4  28.8  22.1  8.0  3.0 
2009  22.7  16.0 28.1 18.5 13.5 12.1 
Average 
1994-2009 
21.9  12.0 28.7 15.9 10.5  8.8 
Notes:  
1.  Cells show the ratio of the standard deviation of log gross hourly earnings among non-members to that 
among union members. 
2.  Regression-adjusted gap based on models with following controls: gender, age, age squared, 
qualifications (5 categories), white/non-white, manual/non-manual, temporary/permanent, full-15 
 
time/part-time, size of workplace (25+ emps), private/public sector, industry sector (13 categories), 
region (21 categories) and whether the employee is covered by collective bargaining. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from LFS (GB). 
Finally, it is worth asking whether the union premium seen in respect of wages also extends 
to other terms and conditions? One issue of concern to most workers is their entitlement to 
paid holidays. A larger holiday entitlement raises the wage/effort ratio in the same way as an 
increase in pay. New analysis of the LFS shows that, in 1998, just after the introduction of the 
Working Time Regulations (WTR), union members received paid holidays equivalent to 
9.5% of annual working hours whilst non-members received the equivalent of just 7.0% (a 
difference of around 6 days). After controlling for our standard set of employee, job and 
workplace characteristics, the union premium falls to around 3 days. In the first half of the 
Noughties, the unadjusted union premium then fell to around 4.5 days and the adjusted 
premium to just under 2.5 days; this might presumably be at least partly the result of the 
gradual implementation of the WTR, which can be expected to have increased some very low 
entitlements in non-union firms. In 2009, union members received 4 days of additional paid 
leave, on average; a figure which falls to around 1.5 days after controlling for other factors.
4 
A ‘holiday’ premium is thus apparent among union members, although it has declined in 
magnitude over the past decade.  
Other evidence suggests that union members also benefit in terms of greater access to family-
friendly working arrangements (e.g. Budd and Mumford, 2004), greater access to training 
(e.g. Stuart and Robinsion, 2007) and better levels of health and safety at work (e.g. Litwin, 
2000). Union membership therefore does still lead to better terms and conditions for the 
average employee, although the size of this advantage appears to have diminished recently.  
3.3  Workplace financial performance and climate 
If unions raise wages without a commensurate rise in productivity, financial performance will 
suffer. Where product markets are uncompetitive this might imply a simple transfer from 
capital to labour with no efficiency effects but, in an increasingly globalised and de-regulated 
marketplace, reduced profitability is liable to result in lower investment rates making 
unionised firms vulnerable to closure or takeover.  
Empirical evidence for the last quarter century indicates that the negative effect of 
unionisation on workplace financial performance was last evident in the 1980s: the 
regression-adjusted gap was not significant from 1990 onwards (Table 6). There are a number 
of potential reasons for this change. First, the union wage premium has fallen somewhat, thus 
lowering the labour costs associated with unions. Second, unions have negotiated away many 
of the labour demarcation practices which inhibited labour flexibility in the past. Third, 
unions helped managers innovate through the adoption of productivity-enhancing high-
involvement management (HIM) practices such that, by the early Noughties, they were just 




                                                 
4 The union premium of 1.5 days is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.  16 
 
Table 6: Union effects on workplace financial performance relative to industry average 
among private sector workplaces with 25+ employees 
  1980 1984 1990 1998  2004  1990-2004 



























1.  ‘Raw gap’ is the coefficient (with z-statistics in parentheses) for ordered logit estimates of a three-category 
ordered variable providing the workplace manager’s subjective evaluation of workplace performance 
relative to its competitors.  
2.  ‘Regression adjusted gap’ controls for single-digit industry; region; establishment size; single; foreign, % 
female; % part-time; % non-manual; workplace age. 
3.  *=significant at a 90% confidence level; **=significant at a 95% confidence level or above. 
Source: Blanchflower and Bryson (2009). 
Table 7 and Table 8 go on to show that the negative effect of unions on the climate of 
workplace relations also weakened in the 1990s and Noughties. Table 7 shows evidence from 
WERS which is similar to that presented in Table 6. In each survey in the WERS series, 
managers have been asked to rate the climate of employment relations in their workplace on a 
five-point scale. In 1980, 984 and 1990, managers in unionised workplaces were less likely 
than those in non-union workplaces to say that employment relations were good and were 
more likely to say that they were poor. But that relationship disappeared in 1998 and 2004. 
Table 6 presents evidence from employees (taken from BSAS) which shows that, in the 
1980s, the climate of employment relations was less likely to be rated positively by 
employees in unionised workplaces than by their counterparts in non-unionised workplaces, 
even after compositional differences had been accounted for through regression analysis. 
However, the regression-adjusted difference (net of compositional effects) disappeared in the 
mid-1990s.  
Table 7: Climate of employment relations (managers’ ratings), 1980-2004 
  1980 1984 1990 1998  2004  1990-2004 



























Notes: See Table 6. 
Source: Blanchflower and Bryson (2009). 17 
 
 














Raw  gap  -0.32** -0.32** -0.24** -0.24** -0.25** -0.20** 
Regression-adjusted gap  -0.11*  -0.12** -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Notes:  
1.  ‘Raw gap’ is the coefficient for ordered logit estimates of a four-category ordered variable providing 
the employee’s subjective evaluation of how good relations are between management and employees at 
their workplace.  
2.  Regression-adjusted gap based on model with following controls: union membership; gender; ethnicity; 
age; qualifications; part-time employment; social class; region; sector (public, manufacturing, 
construction; private services as reference); establishment size. 
3.  ** = statistically significantly different from zero at 1% level; * = statistically significantly different 
from zero at 5% level. 
Source: British Social Attitude Surveys, 1985-2008. 
It is possible to cast this evidence in terms of increasingly ineffectual unions. However, other 
analysis using the 2004 WERS shows that unions continue to reduce voluntary quits (Bryson 
and Forth, 2009). This supports Freeman and Medoff’s notion that unions can provide a voice 
mechanism that helps to resolve individual grievances. When put with the evidence of 
increasingly benign effects on workplace performance and of the absence of widespread dis-
harmony, it is possible to cast the evidence in terms of a refashioning of unions’ relationship 
with employers, and thus to see it as evidence of a ‘partnership’ approach which is both less 
antagonistic and more focused on the long-term success of the firm. The percentage of 
employees in BSA who say the workplace union is doing its job well has been rising since 
1997 so that, by the late Noughties, seven-in-ten employees thought unions were doing a 
good job. The trend is apparent among union members and non-members (Figure 7). There is 
thus some support for the notion that unions have re-oriented themselves in recent years.  18 
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage agreeing union doing its job well, 1983-2008 
 
Note: Employees working 10+ hours in unionized workplaces. 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey. 19 
 
4.  Unions’ Prospects 
Hand in hand with the decline in union membership, union density and union bargaining 
coverage in British workplaces has gone a diminution in the stature and status of unions in 
society. Their place at the top table of political power, seemingly assured in the 1960s and 
1970s, has gone. Any thought that New Labour would usher in a new era of ‘beer and 
sandwiches’ at Number 10 was no more than a mirage. Instead unions are just one of many 
interests jockeying for position in the hope of defending what is now often characterised as a 
sectional interest – that of workers. This fundamental change in the role of unions is reflected 
in perceptions of how much power unions are perceived to have in society. In the mid-1980s 
the percentage of employees who thought that unions had too much power in society 
outnumbered those saying they had too little by a factor of 5:1 (53% against 10%, BSA), with 
only one-in-twenty being unsure. According to the latest available figures, for 2007, the 
situation has been reversed: those saying unions have too little power outnumber those saying 
they have too much by a factor of 2:1 (24% against 13%). A further 20% said they could not 
decide, perhaps reflecting greater uncertainty about precisely what unions do today now that 
they are far less prominent than they used to be. 
There is a rather old and tired debate in industrial relations, both in Britain and in the US, 
regarding the prospects for union revival. Underlying this debate is a preoccupation with the 
power unions once wielded. It juxtaposes prospects for a ‘Second Coming’ for unions in 
which they rebuild their political and industrial power on the back of new organizing 
strategies, and the prospect of terminal decline leading to near-annihilation. This debate 
rarely touches on a third scenario, namely unionisation in a guise, form and status similar to 
that which it enjoys currently. Trade unionism still constitutes the largest voluntary 
organisation in Britain; it represents 7 million employees; negotiates on behalf of one-third of 
employees; still dominates workplace employment relations in the public sector; and 
continues to influence important aspects of working life in the private sector as well. But the 
challenge for unions today is to prevent further weakening of their position as they face what 
is, undoubtedly, a less supportive economic and political environment. It appears that unions 
have ‘upped their game’ to some degree. Whether they are doing enough remains to be seen.  20 
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